### Russia's Interests

Russia’s current position on the Caspian can best be summarized by Andranik Migranyan’s 1994 assertion in Moscow’s Nezavisimaya Gazeta, “All the geopolitical space of the former USSR constitutes the sphere of vital interests of Russia.” That statement emphasized what, in essence, amounts to a Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine. Any regional or international actors in the Caspian are warned that, “Moscow will vigorously oppose all attempts to build up the political or military influence of third countries in the states adjoining Russia.” Much like the United States of Monroe’s time, though suffering from numerous internal problems and conflicts of interest, Russia still remains able to impose its will on the region for two reasons: its advantageous regional position; and the vast network of links with the former Soviet republics still left over from the Communist era.

Currently, Moscow has four chief policy goals towards the area. The first is an overriding concern with security. The permeable borders of the newly independent states, and the waves of ethnic separatists, revolutionaries, and simple drug smugglers and criminals that continue to pour into the Federation from its Southern rim all prove the dangers that the newly independent Caspian states pose to Russia's security. Three-fourths of Europe’s heroin supplies now come from Central Asia, and they all first have to pass through Russia.

Moreover, the CIS states on Russia’s southern border (with the possible exception of Armenia), until this very day, have almost no independent defense capability. The local officer cadres are virtually all Russian, once again with the exception of Armenia, which leaves the regional capitals incapable or organizing any sort of effective armed forces. Consequently, if there were ever an invasion by Turkey, Iran, or the West through the southern tier, as Defense Minister Grachev once complained, “The Moscow military district would become virtually the front line."

This not so new obsession with security furthermore reflects the reemergence of newly determined communist/nationalist forces throughout the nation, particularly in Parliament, and the corresponding weakness of the reformers; as well as the realization that the West has proved unwilling or unable to step in financially and solve all of Russia’s fiscal problems. That, in turn, means that Russia no longer had to be as conciliatory towards the West.

Moscow's second policy goal marks the growing concern over the security of ethnic Russians living in the “Near Abroad”. There were some twelve million Russians living in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus in 1992, and there are still some nine million there today. Yeltsin, and more recently Primakov, have repeatedly, “reiterated the right of Russia to conduct “peacemaking in the Near Abroad to protect Russian speakers,”
The third Russian objective reflects the ever-present concern in Moscow over the perceived Muslim or pan-Turkik threat. Though this concern has died down in the last few years, there are still occasional calls in the Muslim Republics, and in Ankara and Tehran, respectively, for a pan-Turkik or a pan-Islamic state; each of these calls inevitably followed by a corresponding surge of activity in Moscow.

Finally, the fourth and last main motive for Moscow’s determination to regain its influence in the Caspian stems from the rising pressure upon the government from the economic elites. The military-industrial complex needs the Caspian as a source of raw materials, and the business oligarchs in Moscow are very interested in the energy development opportunities present in the Caspian.

Any one of the above four goals demands a partial subordination of the newly independent states’ sovereignty. Together, they mark “The whole southern tier of the former USSR a zone of feverish Russian activity aimed at tightening Moscow’s grip.” Consequently, it is no surprise that Moscow is so determined to prevent or sabotage any proposed pipeline route which, by granting the Caspian states a measure of financial and political independence, could possibly serve to draw any CIS state out of Russia’s sphere of influence.

To date, Russia has managed to largely achieve its goals in the region. It has successfully played Turkish and Iranian interests off against each other, thus forestalling the spread of either pan-Islamic or pan-Turkik influence. The unfriendly governments of Elchibey (in Azerbaijan) and Gamsakhurdia (in Georgia) have been overthrown, and both of these countries are now far more tied to Moscow than they were in 1991. Russian diplomats have managed to defeat any plans for a trans-Caspian pipeline by cooperating with Iran in raising legal and environmental issues. Kazakhstan is inextricably tied to Moscow, giving Russia a virtually guaranteed stake in any Kazakh pipeline. Finally, the deep penetration of Georgia by Russian interests makes any pipeline through that country highly vulnerable to pressure from Moscow.

To sum up, if left to its own devices, Moscow will be loath to let the Caspian states escape from its sphere of influence. However, the possibilities of huge profits in any ensuing pipeline route should make the majority of Russian leaders willing to cooperate. As long as Russia is given some sort of stake in the export routes from the region, the Russian government, particularly due to Russia’s recent economic collapse, would be unlikely to actively oppose them.

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