Nagorno-Karabakh is an ethnic Armenian enclave in the middle of Azerbaijan.
Home to 160,000 people, 95 percent of whom are Christian Armenians, it
is the size of Delaware. To the west of the enclave lies Armenia, less
than five miles away at the nearest point. Iran is approximately 15 miles
to the south.
Full-scale war broke out between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh in 1991,
after the ethnic Armenians in the enclave (aka Karabakhis) demanded independence
or the absorption of the region into Armenia. Still going on today, the
war is now the longest-running conflict in the former Soviet Union.
The Karabakhis, with the help of Armenia, fight for self-determination
and independence from Azerbaijan; the Azeris fight for the territorial
integrity of their country.
In the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, an estimated 35,000 soldiers and civilians have been killed, and one million others have been displaced from their homes. The territory stands as a devastated war zone subject to an economic blockade which has resulted in severe shortages of food and medicine. Ground assaults, shelling, air raids, and heavy artillery have been used by both sides. Although a Russian-mediated cease-fire has been in effect since 1994, over 400 people still die each year on the front lines.
A diplomatic team from Russia, France, and the United States has been trying to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. They want the enclave returned to Azerbaijan but given “maximum possible autonomy.” Armenia has rejected this, vowing never to allow Azerbaijan to rule there again. The question of how and where to settle the refugees remains unanswered.
Nagorno-Karabakh is essential to both the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Ceyhan pipeline
routes. In the Baku-Supsa route, for example, the pipeline skirts the enclave
itself and other Armenian-occupied territory as it makes its way out of
Azerbaijan and into Georgia. Armenians, especially extremists living in
the Javakheti region of south-central Georgia, have talked about interrupting
this flow of oil out of Azerbaijan. Further, the Baku-Supsa route does
not deal with the problem of the Bosphorus. If Turkey shut the area down
as the result of war, for example, there would be no way to get the oil
to the West. A pipeline that bypasses the Bosphorus may have to be built
in addition to a Baku-Supsa MEP (Main Export Pipeline). This alternative
pipeline could conceivably run through Armenia and the areas around Nagorno-Karabakh,
particularly if the conflict is resolved soon. Finally, the relative inexpensiveness
of the Baku-Supsa line may allow for a second pipeline sometime in the
future. A second pipeline may involve a route through Armenia, either to
resolve the Bosphorus issue or to tie Armenia closer to the West and end
its isolation.
Nagorno-Karabakh is also strategically important in a Baku-Ceyhan route.
Concerns about Armenian terrorism would remain, as the Baku-Ceyhan route
would also travel through territory inhabited by ethnic Armenians. More
important, however, is Armenia’s exclusion under such a route. The tremendous
increase in wealth of three countries on its borders, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
and Turkey—two of which are Armenia’s enemies—would only anger Armenia
and isolate the country even more. Further, Russia, in order to weaken
Turkey, its regional rival, and angered by the fact that the MEP does not
go through its territory, would continue to arm Armenia and the Karabakhis.
Thus, a Baku-Ceyhan route could ignite an arms race in the Caucasus—something
the United States wants to avoid at all costs.