Kazakhstan has two primary goals in securing pipeline
routes for its oil. The first and foremost is to gain economic
and political independence. The second is to establish a friendly
and cooperative relationship with Russia, a neighbor
with whom Kazakhstan shares a 4,500 mile border. In light of these
two goals, President Nazarbayev has pursued routes through
Iran and Turkey in addition to a route through
Russia.
Common economic and security ties left over from the Soviet Union draw Kazakhstan strongly toward Russia. Prior to independence, Russia accounted for approximately seventy percent of Kazakhstan’s total trade. Today, eighty percent of all Kazakhstan’s exports to the CIS states go to Russia. While a part of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, due to its long border with China, housed several nuclear plants and significant numbers of Russian military personnel and facilities. After it gained its independence, Kazakhstan returned much of this military arsenal to Russia, and the nuclear power plants closed down. However, many Soviet-era defense factories and facilities are still operational, such as the Baikanour Space Center, and are heavily invested in by Russia.
Economically, Moscow has exerted its leverage in several ways. The only gas export routes available to Kazakhstan today are through Russia and are run by Russia’s Gazprom. In competition for European markets, Gasprom sells only Russian gas to Europe while distributing Kazakh gas within Russia. Consequently, Kazakhstan gets only a portion of what its gas is worth. Russia also controls many oil and gas factories in Northern Kazakhstan, where the majority is ethnic Russian, not Kazakh. Moscow has regularly left these factories without power, primarily as a punishment for state debts.
The primary security concern in AlmaAty is Russia’s potential to fuel a
secessionist movement among the six million Russians in Kazakhstan.
Discontent among the Russian minority is already present — they desire
dual citizenship with Russia, a privatization policy that does not favor
Kazakhs, and the establishment of Russian as the official state language.
President Nazarbayev so far has been able to guarantee political stability
in the short term by balancing Kazakh and Russian interests. However,
any of his potential successors would probably prove either pro-Kazakh
or pro-Russian, which could provoke a bloody national crisis.
Iran and Turkey are both interested in building better relations with Kazakhstan. For example, Demirel states, “As president of the Turkish Republic, I want to say the following to the Kazakh people and to the honorable president Nazarbayev: Under all conditions, and on every issue, Turkey will be on the side of Kazkahstan.” From such friendship, Turkey would like to see some Kazakh oil delivered through a Ceyhan pipeline.
Iran, likewise, would like to secure a transit route through its territory for Kazakh oil. From Kazakhstan’s perspective, however, Iran differs from Turkey in one crucial way — Iran has its own reserves to consider. As with Russia, this would present risks flowing out of a conflict of interest.