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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
LIST OF FIGURES	xi
LIST OF TABLES.....	xv
1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 1999 Izmit Earthquake	1
1.2 Seismological and Geotechnical Aspects.....	1
1.3 Scope and Organization of Report	3
2 EVOLUTION OF SEISMIC BUILDING DESIGN PRACTICE IN TURKEY.....	9
2.1 Introduction	9
2.2 Major Earthquakes in Turkey in the 20th Century	10
2.3 Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete.....	11
2.4 Seismic Design Codes	11
2.4.1 Years 1940 to 1953.....	11
2.4.2 Years 1954 to 1967.....	12
2.4.3 Years 1968 through 1971.....	13
2.4.4 Years 1972 through 1996.....	15
2.4.5 Years after 1997.....	17
2.5 Comparison of United States and Turkish Codes of Practice	18
2.6 Summary Remarks	19
3 REINFORCED CONCRETE FRAME AND WALL BUILDINGS	29
3.1 Introduction	29
3.2 Construction Practice.....	29
3.3 Moment-Resisting Frame Construction	30
3.3.1 Typical Framing Systems for Residential Construction.....	30
3.3.2 Typical Construction Details	31
3.4 Behavior of Moment-Resisting Frame Construction	32
3.4.1 Moment-Frame Buildings Straddling or Adjacent the Line of Rupture.....	32
3.4.2 Variability of Moment-Frame Building Response	33
3.4.3 Role of Infill Walls in Response of Moment-Frame Buildings.....	33
3.5 Response of Moment-Frame Components	34
3.5.1 Beams	34
3.5.2 Columns.....	34
3.5.3 Beam-Column Joints	35
3.5.4 Asmolen Slab System.....	36
3.6 Shear-Wall Construction	36
3.6.1 Behavior of Shear-Wall Construction	36
3.7 Performance of Selected Buildings	37
3.7.1 Building A	37
3.7.1.1 Building Description	37

3.7.1.2	Component Failures.....	38
3.7.1.3	System Response	38
3.7.2	Building B.....	39
3.7.2.1	Building Description	39
3.7.2.2	Component Failures.....	39
3.7.2.3	System Response	40
3.7.3	Building C.....	40
3.7.3.1	Building Description	40
3.7.3.2	Component Failures.....	41
3.7.3.3	System Response	41
3.7.4	Building D	42
3.7.4.1	Building Description	42
3.7.4.2	System Response	42
3.7.5	Summary Remarks	42
4	INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES	77
4.1	Overview of Construction and Damage	77
4.1.1	Introduction	77
4.1.2	In-Situ Reinforced Concrete Structures.....	81
4.1.3	Prefabricated Reinforced Concrete Structures.....	81
4.1.4	Steel-Frame Structures.....	82
4.2	Petrochemical Industry	82
4.2.1	Introduction	82
4.2.2	Tüpras Refinery	83
4.2.2.1	Introduction	83
4.2.2.2	Loading Jetty	84
4.2.2.3	Tank Farms and Floating Roof Tanks	84
4.2.2.4	Main Processing Facility	85
4.2.3	Petkim Petrochemical Plant.....	86
4.3	Automotive Industry.....	86
4.3.1	Introduction	86
4.3.2	Ford Assembly Plant	87
4.3.3	Hyundai Assembly Plant	87
4.3.4	Toyota Assembly Plant.....	87
4.3.5	Pirelli Tire Plant.....	88
4.3.6	Goodyear Tire Plant.....	88
4.3.7	BekSA.....	88
4.3.8	DuSA	88
4.3.9	KordSA	89
4.4	Power Generation and Transmission Systems	89
4.4.1	Introduction	89
4.4.2	Power Generation	89
4.4.3	Power Transmission	90
4.5	Other Heavy Industry	91
4.5.1	Bastas Plant.....	91
4.5.2	Çap Plant.....	91

4.5.3 Habas Plant	91
4.5.4 Mannesmann Boru Plant	92
4.5.5 SEKA Plant.....	92
4.5.6 Liquid Gas Tanks.....	93
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	139
5.1 Summary.....	139
5.2 Conclusions and Recommendations.....	140
APPENDIX PERFORMANCE OF THE ADAPAZARI CITY HALL.....	143
A.1 Introduction	143
A.2 Background Information	143
A.3 1967 Akyazi Earthquake, Damage and Building Retrofit.....	144
A.4 1999 Kocaeli Earthquake and Aftershock	145
A.5 Summary Remarks	145
REFERENCES	153

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1	Map of affected region showing horizontal and vertical offsets.....	4
Figure 1-2	Vertical offset measured near Ford plant in Gölcük.....	4
Figure 1-3	Acceleration time histories from the YPT station.....	5
Figure 1-4	Acceleration response spectra for 5% damping.....	6
Figure 1-5	Failure of a bridge over the Trans-European Motorway.....	7
Figure 1-6	Unseating of the simply supported span from the abutment-mounted bearings.....	7
Figure 1-7	Collapsed and submerged bridge near Akyazi.....	8
Figure 2-1	Distribution of coefficient C_0 with height above grade in 1961 seismic code.....	21
Figure 2-2	1963 earthquake zonation map (IAEE 1966).....	21
Figure 2-3	Spectral coefficients, S , from 1975 seismic code.....	22
Figure 2-4	Detailing requirements for beams and shear walls from 1975 seismic code.....	23
Figure 2-5	Detailing requirements for columns from 1975 code.....	24
Figure 2-6	Earthquake zonation map of Turkey (1997 Turkish Seismic Code).....	25
Figure 2-7	Transverse reinforcement requirements for beams (1997 Seismic Code).....	25
Figure 2-8	Column confinement zones and detailing requirements (1997 Seismic Code).....	26
Figure 2-9	Comparison of elastic response spectra from 1997 UBC and Turkish seismic codes.....	27
Figure 2-10	Comparison of lateral force coefficient, C , in the 1997 UBC, and 1975 and 1997 Turkish seismic codes.....	28
Figure 3-1	High-quality apartment building construction in Yalova.....	44
Figure 3-2	Poor-quality construction of a shear wall in an apartment building in Yalova.....	44
Figure 3-3	Homeowner apartment building construction.....	45
Figure 3-4	Construction details for apartment building of Figure 3-3.....	45
Figure 3-5	Typical framing systems in the epicentral region.....	46
Figure 3-6	Three-story moment-resisting frame east of Gölcük.....	46
Figure 3-7	Floor plan for three-story building of Figure 3-6.....	47
Figure 3-8	Plan of roof framing for a five-story apartment.....	47
Figure 3-9	Typical modern beam and column rebar details.....	48
Figure 3-10	Hollow clay tile block used for infill walls.....	48
Figure 3-11	Asmolen floor system in a four-story building.....	49
Figure 3-12	Collapse of moment-frame buildings in Gölcük.....	49
Figure 3-13	Collapsed moment-frame and wall buildings in Adapazari.....	50
Figure 3-14	Collapsed school building that straddled the line of rupture.....	50
Figure 3-15	Collapsed and damaged moment-frame buildings on the Gölcük naval base.....	51
Figure 3-16	Collapsed building that straddled the line of rupture.....	51
Figure 3-17	Undamaged building located within 2 m of the line of rupture.....	52
Figure 3-18	Variability of building response.....	52
Figure 3-19	Varying degrees of damage to infill masonry walls.....	53
Figure 3-20	Damage to infill masonry walls.....	54
Figure 3-21	Collapsed apartment building in Gölcük.....	54
Figure 3-22	Failure of two stories of a moment-frame building with infill masonry walls.....	55
Figure 3-23	Formation of a soft and weak story.....	55
Figure 3-24	Damage to a nonductile reinforced concrete beam.....	56
Figure 3-25	Failure of lap splices in a moment-frame column.....	56

Figure 3-26	Typical transverse reinforcement details in columns	57
Figure 3-27	Shear failure of a moment-frame blade column.....	57
Figure 3-28	Lack of transverse reinforcement in moment-frame column	58
Figure 3-29	Shear cracking in short columns	58
Figure 3-30	Damage resulting from column-infill masonry wall interaction.....	59
Figure 3-31	Concentrated damage at ends of moment-frame columns due to drift	59
Figure 3-32	Damage and failures at ends of moment-frame columns.....	60
Figure 3-33	Damage to moment-frame columns	60
Figure 3-34	Damage to moment-frame beam-column joints.....	61
Figure 3-35	Building collapse due to failure of beam-column joints	61
Figure 3-36	Damage to new moment-frame beam-column joints	62
Figure 3-37	Typical damage to asmlen floor systems	62
Figure 3-38	Shear wall building under construction at the time of the earthquake	63
Figure 3-39	Undamaged apartment building in Gölcük	63
Figure 3-40	Shear wall building damaged due to fault rupture	64
Figure 3-41	Collapsed dual wall-frame building in Adapazari.....	64
Figure 3-42	Damaged wall-frame building due to ground failure and wall rotation.....	65
Figure 3-43	Damage to short walls or blade columns	66
Figure 3-44	Front elevation of Building A	67
Figure 3-45	Rear elevation of Building A showing intact infill masonry walls.....	67
Figure 3-46	Building A first-floor plan.....	68
Figure 3-47	Damage to first-story columns	68
Figure 3-48	Damage at the rear stairwell.....	69
Figure 3-49	Shear failure of Column A (see Figure 3-46).....	69
Figure 3-50	Axial failure of Column B (see Figure 3-46)	70
Figure 3-51	Axial failure at the lap splice in Column C (see Figure 3-46)	70
Figure 3-52	Elevation of Building B.....	71
Figure 3-53	Details of damage to the third-story column.....	71
Figure 3-54	Elevation of Building C.....	72
Figure 3-55	View of retail space in first story of building.....	72
Figure 3-56	Shear crack in first-story column in rear of building	73
Figure 3-57	Damaged beam-column joints at top of first-story columns.....	73
Figure 3-58	Damaged beam-column joint at top of first-story corner column.....	74
Figure 3-59	Elevation of Building D	74
Figure 3-60	Settlement of Building D due to liquefaction and soil-bearing failure	75
Figure 4-1	Map of the eastern end of Izmit Bay	94
Figure 4-2	Aerial photograph of industrial facilities in Körfez looking west.....	94
Figure 4-3	Prefabricated reinforced concrete construction.....	95
Figure 4-4	Typical plank roof construction and damaged doveled connections	96
Figure 4-5	Foundation connection for prefabricated reinforced concrete facilities.....	97
Figure 4-6	Damaged precast reinforced concrete framed building.....	98
Figure 4-7	Five-story steel-framed industrial facility under construction	99
Figure 4-8	Tank farm fires at the Tüpras refinery	100
Figure 4-9	Aerial photograph of Tüpras refinery showing part of tank farm.....	101
Figure 4-10	Aerial photograph of Tüpras refinery.....	101
Figure 4-11	Aerial photograph of loading and unloading jetty at Tüpras refinery.....	102

Figure 4-12	Failed crude-oil pipeline along the sea wall at the Tüpras refinery	102
Figure 4-13	Photograph from the sea wall of damaged loading and unloading jetty	103
Figure 4-14	Damage to jetty and elevated pipeway at Tüpras refinery	104
Figure 4-15	Tank 211 in Tüpras refinery tank farm	104
Figure 4-16	Floating roof of Tank 211 and spilled oil due to fluid sloshing.....	105
Figure 4-17	Perimeter seal of floating roof in Tank 211	105
Figure 4-18	Part view of Tüpras tank farm showing Tank 211 and two tank burn zones.....	106
Figure 4-19	Overtopping of tank wall due to fluid sloshing and failure of perimeter seals	106
Figure 4-20	View of tank wall damage.....	107
Figure 4-21	Photograph from top of Tank 211 looking approximately south (1 of 2).....	107
Figure 4-22	Photograph from top of Tank 211 looking approximately south (2 of 2).....	108
Figure 4-23	Photograph of tank destroyed by fire in tank burn zone 1	108
Figure 4-24	Photograph of tank destroyed by fire in tank burn zone 2	109
Figure 4-25	Destroyed walls, walkways, and floating roof of tank of Figure 4-24.....	109
Figure 4-26	Gross expansion of fixed roof tank adjacent to tank of Figure 4-24.....	110
Figure 4-27	Photograph of failed 300-ft-tall heater stack.....	110
Figure 4-28	Damage to heater unit caused by collapse of heater stack	111
Figure 4-29	Damage to pipework caused by collapse of heater stack	111
Figure 4-30	Typical framing in the main processing facility of the Tüpras refinery.....	112
Figure 4-31	Collapsed wooden cooling tower at the Petkim petrochemical facility	113
Figure 4-32	Damage to nonductile reinforced concrete columns in Petkim cooling tower	113
Figure 4-33	Rebar details and damage in reinforced concrete cooling tower at Petkim	114
Figure 4-34	Loading and unloading port facility at the Petkim petrochemical plant	114
Figure 4-35	Failure of battered reinforced concrete piles beneath jetty at Petkim facility.....	115
Figure 4-36	Framing of new body shop in Ford plant near Gölcük	115
Figure 4-37	Ground movement near the Ford plant in Gölcük.....	116
Figure 4-38	Exterior view of the damaged Ford body shop	116
Figure 4-39	Photograph of the BekSA plant.....	117
Figure 4-40	Damage to the DuSA main plant building	117
Figure 4-41	Photograph of KordSA main building showing steel brace framed tower	118
Figure 4-42	Perimeter of precast reinforced concrete framed DuSA main plant building	118
Figure 4-43	Roof collapse in storage area at KordSA plant	119
Figure 4-44	Rail-mounted transformers in the EnerjiSA transformer yard.....	119
Figure 4-45	Toppled transformer in EnerjiSA transformer yard	120
Figure 4-46	Heat-recovery steam boiler in the EnerjiSA plant	121
Figure 4-47	Damage to steel framing of the in-service EnerjiSA steam generator	122
Figure 4-48	Damage to steel framing of the new EnerjiSA steam generator	123
Figure 4-49	Aerial photograph of the Adapazari substation.....	124
Figure 4-50	Fractured porcelain components	125
Figure 4-51	Pre- and post-earthquake circuit breakers and rigid bus connectors.....	126
Figure 4-52	Braced Hitachi gas circuit breaker	127
Figure 4-53	Power transformers at the Adapazari substation.....	128
Figure 4-54	Precast reinforced concrete buildings at the Çap textile plant	129
Figure 4-55	Liquid gas tanks at the Habas plant.....	130
Figure 4-56	Liquid nitrogen tank at the Habas facility	131
Figure 4-57	Collapse of the liquid oxygen tanks	132

Figure 4-58	Buckling of the outer stainless steel shell in a liquid oxygen tank	132
Figure 4-59	Photographs of failed columns beneath a liquid oxygen tank at the Habas facility.....	133
Figure 4-60	Cranes in Mannesmann Boru large-pipe storage area.....	134
Figure 4-61	Damaged port facilities at the SEKA paper mill.....	135
Figure 4-62	Silos at the SEKA paper mill	136
Figure 4-63	Cylindrical liquid gas tanks.....	137
Figure A-1	Typical plan and elevation of the original building	147
Figure A-2	Building damage after the 1967 Akyazi earthquake	148
Figure A-3	Damage in the original building columns in the 1967 Akyazi earthquake	148
Figure A-4	Typical floor plan after retrofit showing the location of new shear walls	149
Figure A-5	Front elevation after the retrofit in 1968 (rigid beams and shear walls added)	149
Figure A-6	City Hall after the November 12, 1999, Duzce earthquake	150
Figure A-7	Acceleration spectra for the August 17, 1999, main shock, the November 11, 1999, aftershock, and the November 12, 1999, main shock	151

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1-1	Recorded peak ground accelerations.....	2
Table 2-1	Key events in the evolution of seismic design codes in Turkey	10
Table 2-2	Values of n_1	13
Table 2-3	Values of n_2	13
Table 2-4	Structural type coefficient, K , from 1975 code	16
Table 2-5	Response modification factors in current seismic codes.....	19
Table 4-1	Industrial facilities visited by the PEER reconnaissance team	78
Table 4-2	Structural damage classification.....	79
Table 4-3	Nonstructural damage classification	79
Table 4-4	Damage to industrial facilities visited by the PEER reconnaissance team	80
Table A-1	Characteristics of the Adapazari City Hall (Anadol 1972)	144